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Abstract
Inadequate regulation of the financial system is widely thought to have contributed to 
the financial crisis. The purpose of the book is to articulate a framework within which 
financial regulation can be analysed in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. The book’s 
approach is distinctive in several respects. First, it views the subject from a multidisciplinary 
perspective of economics, finance and law. Second, it takes a holistic approach, starting 
from the premise that financial regulation is best understood in the context of an 
appreciation of the entire financial system. Third it is international and comparative in 
nature, contrasting approaches, in particular in the EU and US. The book focuses on 
underlying policies and the objectives of regulation, using specific regulatory measures as 
examples. This allows the reader to compare choices in respect of the same policy issue 
in different regulatory frameworks. This introductory chapter sets out the motivation for the 
project and outlines the book’s analytic framework and contents.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Over the course of this crisis, we as an industry caused a lot of damage. Never has it been clearer how 
mistakes made by financial companies can affect Main Street, and we need to learn the lessons of the past few 
years.” 
 Brian T. Moynihan, CEO and President, Bank of America 
Testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-9 was the most serious economic disturbance in the post WW2 era. It 
caused a major contraction in economic activity in developed countries around the world with 
estimated losses of more than $15 trillion – approximately one-fifth of the value of total world 
annual production.1  Firms cut investment and laid off workers, causing substantial increases in 
unemployment and significant economic hardship from which many economies are only just now 
beginning to recover.  National efforts to mitigate the financial crisis triggered a follow-on sovereign 
debt crisis in the Eurozone, which even now is a source of economic instability.   
The questions which many people have been addressing since the crisis first broke are why it 
happened and what can be done to prevent its recurrence.  One of the underlying causes is widely 
thought to have been a failure of financial regulation – a failure to control the excesses in which 
financial institutions were indulging prior to the crisis. Financial regulation was comprehensively 
outmanoeuvred by the changing nature of financial markets and institutions, leaving it exposed to 
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the failures and contagion that occurred in 2008.  While this book is not about the financial crisis, the 
fact that there was such a serious failure of prevailing wisdom before the crisis is a strong motivation 
for writing it. A reconsideration of the nature and conduct of financial regulation is required and this 
book is an attempt to provide exactly that.  Its goal is to articulate a framework within which 
financial regulation can be analysed in a coherent and comprehensive fashion.  
1.1 The changing financial system 
Traditionally financial regulation has distinguished between securities markets and bank regulation.  
Securities regulation has its origins in the US in the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange of 1934, which regulated interstate sale and trading of 
securities respectively and created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce them.  
Bank regulation dates back to the earliest days of the US with the chartering of the first banks but 
the current system of regulation in the US was a product of the Great Depression and the New Deal 
reforms.  The Banking Act of 1933 created federal deposit insurance and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to regulate banks, and it separated commercial from investment 
banking in the Glass-Steagall Act.   The intellectual framework of these discrete categories of 
regulation has been very influential internationally, including in the EU, where distinct streams of 
banking and securities regulation have been produced in the project to develop the single market. 
 Securities markets and banking regulation have undergone significant reform over the 
subsequent 80 years (not least the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999) but the fundamental distinction between securities and banking regulation introduced in the 
1930s remains intact and is the basis of modern financial regulation in the US and many countries 
around the world.2  But while the framing of financial regulation has remained the same, the 
                                                          
2
 The UK sought to make a far-reaching change to the structure of its financial regulation at the turn of the 
century, by creating a single ‘super-regulator’ with responsibility for all aspects of financial regulation—the 
Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’). This was done in explicit recognition of the increasing level of 
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financial system has not.  There have been profound changes, most significantly over the last few 
decades.  
 First, there has been a significant shift in the way funds are channelled from suppliers to 
users of capital.  Commercial banks have been and remain a fundamental route through which this 
occurs via the channelling of bank deposits from savers to borrowers.  Banks remain a particularly 
important source of finance for small and medium sized firms,3 and for the funding of certain types 
of activities, most notably large projects.  But developed securities markets allow investors to enjoy 
the liquidity of bank deposits (i.e. the ability to convert their investments rapidly into cash) through 
selling their securities to other investors rather than through repayments of deposits from banks.  
While the relative size and significance of banks versus securities markets varies appreciably across 
countries,4 many countries have witnessed a substantial growth in the proportion of market-based 
finance over the last 20 years.  
This secular growth in the importance of financial markets has been driven by several factors. 
This first is demography. People have been living longer - average life expectancy at birth today in 
the developed world is 80,5 as compared with 68 in 1950.6  So when state retirement provision was 
introduced in the UK, it was typically paying for just a few years of retirement; now, it is on average 
more than a decade. At the same time, with people having fewer children, the viability in many 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interconnection in the financial system. Unfortunately, whilst the regulators were merged, the intellectual 
frameworks of banking and securities regulation were not. See below, text to nn 17-18. 
3
 See AM Robb and DT Robinson, ‘The Capital Structure Decisions of New Firms’ (2012) Review of Financial 
Studies online advance access doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhs072 (observing that principal source of outside finance for 
newly-formed firms in the US is bank debt). 
4
 See F Allen and D Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (MIT Press, 2001).  
5
 OECD, Health: Key Tables from OECD, Table 1.1, Life Expectancy at Birth, Total Population.  
6
 Office for National Statistics (UK), Mortality, 2010-based NPP Reference Volume (2012), 2 (UK life expectancy 
at birth 68 in 1950); US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999, Table 1421, Expectation 
of Life at Birth (US life expectancy at birth 68 in 1950).  
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countries of traditional state-run pension schemes funded out of current taxes has been undermined.  
Instead, people have increasingly turned to the private sector for pension provision through 
collective savings vehicles offered by pension funds and insurance companies and, especially in the 
US, mutual funds.  These financial intermediaries substitute for banks in the provision of credit to 
the real economy.  Instead of ’bank loans,’ they purchase debt securities issued by borrowers.   Thus 
the demand for pension provision has created a new class of financial intermediaries that operate 
through securities markets and also a new supply of funds available to market-based finance. 
Second, for most of the twentieth century, investments in equities (shares) greatly 
outperformed investments in debt (bank deposits and bonds).7 There are several reasons for this, 
one of which was the erosion of the value of fixed interest investments in periods of high inflation 
during the twentieth century and the high real returns earned on corporate investments during a 
period of rapid industrialization and the introduction of mass production.  The higher returns on 
equity encouraged a shift from saving via bank deposits into equity markets, which in turn further 
fuelled the increase in equity values.  
Third, there have been substantial technological advances that have reduced the costs of 
trading in markets.  In particular the development of computers and new forms of communication 
have dramatically enhanced the power and speed with which investors can trade on financial 
markets.  In many cases, they have also improved the transparency of market trading and increased 
information flows to participants in markets.   
Fourth, globalisation has had a transformative impact on finance, the size of which is difficult 
to overstate. It is revealing that, whereas 30 years ago ‘the financial system’ would to most listeners 
have referred to a set of domestic institutions and markets, today it is typically used to refer to a 
                                                          
7
 For example, $1 invested in a deposit account in 1926 was worth $22 in 2012; $1 invested in investment 
grade bonds was worth $84; $1 in large market capitalization US stocks was worth $3,189; and $1 in small 
market capitalization US stocks was worth $14,370 – 653 times the investment in a deposit account! 
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global network. Whilst the relaxation of national capital controls has permitted this process in many 
countries around the world, the EU’s ambitious programme of economic integration has actively 
fostered it between Member States. These processes increased the overall scale of the financial 
system and increased competition within it. This has led to changes happening more quickly, and 
having a bigger impact.   
International capital flows have triggered the development of new markets for managing 
associated risks in currencies and interest rates. Firms are now able to raise capital on markets 
around the world, which has led to the development of new instruments and institutions for 
managing risks and raising financing on a global basis.  This in turn has generated ‘global imbalances’ 
by which some countries have generated large net surpluses that have added to the stock of global 
funds for investment. Globalisation has also created particular regulatory challenges because no 
single state can authoritatively regulate even its own financial system because of global spillovers 
and linkages. International financial regulation depends upon a unique set of agreements and 
understandings among governments, central banks, and financial regulators that, for the most part 
(the EU being a notable exception), are legally unenforceable.    
We argue in this book that these changes in the nature of financial systems – the growth of 
markets in relation to financial intermediaries and the internationalization of markets – have had 
profound effects on the risks inherent in these systems.  These changes in risks in turn require a 
different structure of financial regulation from that which was established in the first half of the 
twentieth century and, in particular, reform of the historical separation between securities markets 
and bank regulation.  
1.2 The genesis of the financial crisis 
The growth in international financial markets meant that globalisation fostered an appearance of 
greater diversification in risk bearing. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Board of Governors of 
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the US Federal Reserve, opined in 2004 that, ’[n]ot only have individual financial institutions become 
less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has 
become more resilient.’ 8 Such sentiments were widely shared at the time. When Raghuram Rajan, 
then a Professor of Finance at Chicago’s Booth Business School (and now Governor of the Reserve 
Bank of India) suggested at a central bankers’ conference in 2005 that financial globalization might 
have entailed costs as well as benefits, his presentation attracted great scepticism.9 
However, this appearance was deceptive. The changes in the global financial system have 
sowed the seeds of a number of problems. First, the consolidation, and global reach, of large 
financial institutions meant that their individual stability became more important for the global 
system as a whole. Second, the development of new markets for risk meant that the ultimate 
allocation of risk within the system became less transparent. Third, financial institutions’ response to 
competition from markets was essentially, ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. That is, traditional 
commercial banking institutions refocused a number of their business lines on activities that were 
related to, and supported, markets. In particular, the provision of underwriting services to firms 
accessing capital markets, the maintenance of inventories of financial assets to provide market-
making (dealer) services, and actually engaging in trading on their own account (‘proprietary’ 
trading), all became more common.  
Together, these three factors meant that global financial institutions came not to disperse 
risk throughout the system, but to aggregate it within themselves.  Matters were compounded by 
the influx of capital for investment triggered by global demographics and trade imbalances. This 
created a powerful demand for high yielding but safe assets. To meet demand, financial and legal 
innovation produced new types of financial contract. Amongst the best-known of these was 
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 A Greenspan, Remarks at American Bankers Association Annual Convention, New York, October 5, 2004 
(available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2004/20041005/default.htm). 
9
 RG Rajan, ‘Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?’ (2005) Proceedings, Federal Bank of Kansas 
City 313.  
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‘securitization’: the transfer of packages of bank loans, especially mortgages, to free-standing 
‘special purpose entities’, the securities in which were then sold to investors. The parcelling together 
of a diversified portfolio of loan assets helped to lower investment risk, but the really important 
innovation lay in the marketing of a series of different ‘tranches’ of securities in the relevant entities, 
each carrying a different priority. Cash flows received from all the loans in the portfolio could be 
rearranged to give structural priority to payments owed to the senior tranche, creating a ‘waterfall’ 
that shifted the default risks within the portfolio to the junior tranches. These techniques permitted 
financial ‘alchemy’: the transformation of high-risk underlying loan assets into low-risk senior 
securities. 10 
Reliance on financial innovations that promise much, through mechanisms that are not fully 
understood, has a history of ending badly. Securitization had an exponential effect on the complexity 
of factors affecting the risk profiles of the ultimate securities.11  This meant that even sophisticated 
investors were unable to perform meaningful assessments. Instead, they relied on specialist risk 
assessors, the credit rating agencies. These agencies’ ratings turned out not to be very good. In part 
this was due to conflicts of interest: credit rating agencies were paid by the very firms that packaged 
and promoted these securitizations, namely the ‘underwriters.’  The business of rating such 
securitizations was lucrative and the underwriters could shop among the rating agencies for the best 
rating.  12  Moreover, the banks setting up securitized portfolios had incentives to offload loans that 
were of lower quality than those they retained on their own balance sheets.13  
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 E Benmelech and J Dlugosz, ‘The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings’ (2009) 56 Journal of Monetary Economics 
617. 
11
 See K Judge, ‘Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk’ (2012) 
64 Stanford Law Review 657. 
12
 See generally LJ White, ‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 211. 
13
 BJ Keys, T Mukherjee, A Seru and V Vig, ‘Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime 
Loans’ (2010) 125 Quarterly Journal of Economics 307. Interestingly, this problem appears to have been 
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Securitization played a major role in the financial crisis because of the unanticipated 
feedback effects of an influx of capital onto underlying real estate markets. Alongside by a US 
government policy of seeking to extend home ownership to previously excluded individuals, 
securitization facilitated a significant increase in mortgage lending in the United States, especially to 
riskier borrowers. This was because the ‘alchemy’ meant that investors seeking safety could supply 
funds to this risky market.  This influx of funds stimulated a historically unparalleled nationwide rise 
in housing prices.14 In changing the nature of residential mortgage finance from regional to national, 
securitization also confounded seventy years’ experience of the US property market—that property 
price movements were local, rather than national.  Thus the conventional wisdom, that geographical 
distribution of residential real estate investments was an effective way to lower overall risk, proved 
inaccurate. But investors did not appreciate this, with the result that risk in securitized real estate 
transactions was mispriced significantly. In short, securitization, which purported to add stability 
through diversification, instead added risk because it created a new source of correlation. Moreover, 
the securities issued by this process were bought by yield-hungry investors around the world, 
especially in Europe. This helped ensure the global significance of problems in this market.  
It was a fall in US real estate that ignited a spark to this combustible mixture. In 2006-7, 
investors began to realise that the scale of defaults on US subprime mortgages greatly exceeded 
what had been modelled in their expected returns. For several months, everything proceeded in 
state of suspended animation, rather like the cartoon character that has run off a cliff but still 
continues to spin its legs for an instant before it appreciates the effects of gravity.  Then in July 2007, 
bank stock prices fell dramatically as Bear Stearns, the US investment bank, announced it was closing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
avoided in relation to securitizations of corporate loans (so-called ‘CLOs’): E Benmelech, J Dlugosz and V 
Ivashina, ‘Securitization without Adverse Selection: the Case of CLOs’ (2012) 106 Journal of Financial 
Economics 91. 
14
 See R Shiller, The Subprime Solution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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two funds it had promoted, which had invested heavily in subprime assets.15 In August 2007, the 
French Bank BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three investment funds because various 
securitized assets could not be priced, which brought investors into the shocked realization that the 
fall in subprime values could have global dimensions.  
At this point, many financial institutions that had developed close ties to financial markets 
found themselves in difficulty. Securitization markets froze when the credit ratings attached to 
mortgage-backed securities were cast into doubt.  This stranded the vendor banks that held large 
inventories of freshly originated subprime mortgages that had been ‘warehoused’ pending 
securitization.   The supposedly ’off balance sheet’ special purpose entities used in the 
securitizations ran into trouble: They relied on short-term capital market financing to meet short-
term liquidity needs arising from mismatches between cash flows from the underlying mortgage 
borrowers and cash flows promised to investors. Short-term investors, such as money market funds, 
now refused to ‘roll over’ these short-term obligations.  Major underwriting banks were called upon 
to prop up troubled securitization vehicles, either under explicit or implicit guarantees.  Such overt 
action brought the special purpose entities onto bank balance sheets and immediately undercut 
their balance sheets. 
The trouble spread far beyond those undertaking the securitizations. Many banks and other 
financial institutions, both in the US and elsewhere around the world, held substantial volumes of 
mortgage-related securities the values of which were compromised. This meant large balance sheet 
write-downs, although no-one knew whether they were sufficient. Doubtful valuations meant that a 
bank that had financed such holdings substantially through wholesale short-term markets now faced 
the risk of a ‘run.’   British bank Northern Rock fell to such a run in September 2007.   
                                                          
15
 Highly readable accounts of the events surrounding the financial crisis include T Geithner, Stress Test (Crown 
Publishers, 2014); N Irwin, The Alchemists (Penguin, 2013); M Lewis, The Big Short (Norton, 2010); H Paulson, 
On the Brink (Business Plus, 2010); and A R Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (Penguin, 2010).  
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Other financial institutions financed their holdings of mortgage-related and other exotic 
securities with short-term funding that were often collateralized by these very same instruments.   
The funders – concerned about risks to their own viability from these counterparty exposures -- 
insisted on more collateral and/or higher quality, less exotic collateral.  Thus financial institutions 
found themselves under pressure to sell exotic securities to obtain more prosaic assets, such as cash. 
Yet because of the uncertainty surrounding the value of the exotic securities, no-one wanted to buy 
them. 16  
Markets simply dried up, leaving the financial institutions facing a squeeze that was terminal 
in some cases. Bear Stearns narrowly survived failure in March 2008 when a rescue merger was 
facilitated through a loan from the Federal Reserve. When the far larger Lehman Brothers reached 
crisis point in September 2008, potential merger partners were unwilling to take on the much 
greater risks given the limits on the Fed’s capacity (or willingness) to backstop losses, and the 
subsequent bankruptcy became the defining moment of the financial crisis.  
One of the striking features of the mechanics of securitization is the extent to which the 
process operated outside the regulated arena, or at least outside the regulatory provisions designed 
to respond to the kinds of risks it created.  A central goal of banking regulation is to ensure the 
stability of financial institutions. To this end it imposes prudential constraints on the balance sheets 
of banks intended to ensure that these firms are able to withstand an unexpected slump in the value 
of their assets. However, during the go-go years of financial globalisation, it had widely been thought 
that the encroachment of markets onto banking terrain would lessen the need for such regulation. It 
was thought that where assets were marketable or ‘liquid’, a troubled institution could extricate 
itself from problems by converting the assets into cash. Consequently, institutions such as 
investment banks—whether stand-alone or part of a larger financial conglomerate—which held 
assets in the form of marketable securities were subject to far less stringent capital controls than 
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 GB Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (OUP, 2010). 
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loan assets held by traditional commercial banks. The widespread freezing of wholesale markets 
demonstrated that this policy was based on a misapprehension: just when the ability to sell assets 
was needed most, it evaporated. 
1.3 The intellectual framework 
Why were these problems not spotted previously? The changes we have sketched above 
transformed financial sectors into more market-oriented, and more international, arenas than they 
had previously been. Yet thinking about financial regulation remained largely within the same 
intellectual silos it had inhabited for three quarters of a century. The intellectual division between 
securities markets and bank regulation introduced in the 1930s as part of the New Deal had made 
sense at that time, because of the structural separation of the two sectors. Moreover, there were 
always sound pragmatic reasons for focusing on a limited set of issues in order to gain more analytic 
traction. The resulting intellectual partition has continued to frame debates in US law schools and 
policy circles ever since. Not only that, but other jurisdictions, seeking to implement reforms to 
stimulate securities markets, looked to the well-developed institutions and scholarship in the US for 
guidance. Consequently the idea of the partition was exported to frame the structure of financial 
regulation in the EU and elsewhere, and continues to do so even post-crisis. 
The scope of these regimes is incomplete. Banking issues are covered by ‘banking regulation’, 
the domain of which is determined by the question, ‘what is a bank?’  And securities-related issues 
are covered by ‘securities regulation’, the domain of which is determined by the question, ‘what is a 
security?’ Moreover, the goals of these sectoral regulatory regimes are parochial. Banking regulation 
is concerned with the protection of bank deposits and the stability of banks, in part because bank 
depositors are not expected to monitor the quality of bank assets. Securities regulation is concerned 
with the facilitation of regulated markets, and the protection of investors via mandatory disclosure 
that enables investors to fend for themselves in assessing the risks of particular securities.  Safety- 
and-soundness oversight of institutions in securities markets that provide bank-like functions has 
12 
 
been an afterthought in securities regulation; just as how banks use securities markets to substitute 
for traditional means of credit extension (such as securitization) has been an afterthought for bank 
regulation.  
The financial crisis demonstrated the costs of these limitations. Even in terms of their own 
parochial goals, the scope of such regimes does not make sense unless defined in functional terms. 
The appropriate question is therefore not, ‘what does the applicable legislation cover?’, but rather 
‘what sorts of organisations give rise to problems of the regulation is seeking to address?’ That is, 
not so much ‘what is a bank?’ but ‘what ought to be regulated as a bank?’ Likewise, what activities 
can be left to disclosure regimes on the grounds that the relevant actors can knowledgeably 
evaluate and manage risks themselves and what activities require active intervention because they 
cannot?    
More fundamentally, however, the parochial goals of sectoral regulation are limited and 
incomplete from the perspective of the stability of the system as a whole, and quite often in tension 
with one another. This was illustrated all too painfully by the case of the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority (‘FSA’). The FSA, which was inaugurated at the turn of the century with great fanfare, 
operated as a unified financial regulator, encompassing securities, banking, insurance and pensions. 
The idea was that the problems of sectoral regulatory incompleteness would be avoided by putting 
responsibility for all regulation under the same roof. The effect of this was to push the challenge 
onto the way in which the FSA’s priorities were defined. Unfortunately, these were structured simply 
as an amalgamation of the pre-existing parochial ordering of institutional regulators, without 
appreciating the need for a holistic approach to the articulation of goals and their hierarchy. Thus 
the Financial Services Act 2000, which set up the legislative framework for the FSA, articulated a list 
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of goals that did not include ‘financial stability’.17  Of the goals that were included, the FSA arguably 
over-invested in promoting consumer protection, seemingly at the expense of other goals.18  
1.4 This book’s agenda  
The rest of Section A sets out the foundations for the book’s analysis, developing   seven key ideas. 
The first idea is that we aim to provide an account of financial regulation that begins not with 
regulatory instruments but with the financial system. We ask first, what does the financial system do, 
and second, how can regulation help it to function better? This is therefore principally a normative 
rather than a positive exercise. We consider a series of substantive topics in financial regulation in a 
comparative way, explaining differences in how the rules are structured in the EU and the US. These 
provide the opportunity to compare different policy solutions to a series of underlying problems. 
To this end, the next chapter, Chapter 2, gives an overview of the way in which the financial 
system functions. It explains the role the sector as a whole performs in mediating between suppliers 
and users of capital in the economy, and why this matters for economic growth.19  It then describes 
the principal institutional components that perform these various functions. In so doing, it describes 
how the significance of finance that has been intermediated via banks has declined relative to that 
which has been intermediated via markets. This trend has not, however, resulted in a lessening of 
the significance of financial institutions within the sector. Rather, their role has evolved such that 
their functions in relation to the operation of financial markets—underwriting, market-making, and 
proprietary trading—have grown to be at least as significant as the traditional roles of deposit-taking 
and lending.  
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 This was added by the Financial Services Act 2010. 
18
 See Chapter 4. 
19
 The account is therefore functional in orientation: see R Merton and Z Bodie, ‘A Conceptual Framework for 
Analyzing the Financial Environment’, in DB Crane et al (eds.), The Global Financial System: A Functional 
Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), 3. 
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The functioning of the financial system is an economic matter. The second idea on which the 
book is premised is that in our view, it makes most sense to think about the goals of financial 
regulation from a perspective grounded in economics. In Chapter 3, we present an account of the 
goals of financial regulation in economic terms, namely to improve the functioning of institutions 
and markets. Economists have a well-developed understanding of the circumstances and ways in 
which regulatory intervention can do this. The chapter maps these onto the self-styled goals of 
legislative instruments underpinning financial regulation.  
Our understanding of ‘regulation’ is also grounded in this economic approach. We conceive 
of financial regulation as measures imposed by government on the financial sector—primarily 
mandatory rules. Consequently, private agreements between parties are not regulation on this view, 
except insofar law mandates their terms.20  This means the book does not generally consider the 
private law of finance. Whilst outcomes may doubtless be shaped by private law—in particular, the 
degree to which property law facilitates the partitioning of assets—the focus of this book is on the 
mandatory rules of regulation.  In particular, since not all varieties of mandatory rules are the same, 
the final part of Chapter 3 offers a taxonomy that categorizes different types of regulatory strategies 
used in relation to the market failures of the financial system. 
Three further important ideas may be seen as corollaries of the first two. They are so 
important, and so frequently overlooked, that we set them out here as distinct ideas. Applying an 
economic analysis of market failure to the financial system presupposes that we think about the 
financial system in functional rather than institutional terms. This is the third idea informing the 
book, namely that our analysis of the financial system should be functional in orientation. This 
means we are not so much concerned with ‘what is a bank’, but ‘what functions do banks perform’. 
The latter question emphasizes that the firms performing these functions are not necessarily limited 
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to the set of firms categorised by current regulation as ‘banks’. The way in which securitization 
performed many of the same economic functions as conventional banks while residing outside the 
ambit of prudential regulation is a good case in point.  
The way in which the financial system performs its functions is not static. As the account in 
chapter 2 makes clear, the system is subject to continuous change in how it is organised. The fourth 
idea we build upon is that the financial system is dynamic—that is continuously changing—in the 
way it operates, in part in response to changes in regulation itself, and that regulatory responses 
should be calibrated accordingly.  A failure to recognize this was an important underlying cause of 
the inadequacy of financial regulation in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
Another oft-overlooked aspect of financial regulation is that the goals it seeks to further 
sometimes come into conflict. We suspect that the fragmentation of regulation fostered a false 
sense of security about this issue. If one focuses only on a particular sector of the financial system, 
one likely fails to see the costs a particular regulatory intervention may have on other sectors. 
Making use of the first four ideas we have articulated helps us to avoid that kind of mistake. A 
functional account implies that particular market failures do not neatly match up to particular types 
of institution, but that the picture is rather messier. Consequently there is a need to prioritize which 
failures are to be addressed and the fifth idea is to prioritize on the basis of the scale of damages 
that the failures can inflict and minimization of the costs of regulation itself. As we discuss below 
that places particular significance on systemic risks.21  
To identify the economic problems to which financial regulation can, or should, respond is 
not the same thing as solving them. For a variety of reasons, real-world regulation and regulators fall 
short of their goals, even where these goals are appropriately set. In particular, the pervasive 
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complexity and dynamism of the financial system means that it forms a fleeting target for regulatory 
intervention. It is hard for regulators to keep abreast of developments.22  Matters are not helped by 
the fact that inside the system are players who stand to profit from working around whatever 
structures are put in place, and who—in particular, the global financial behemoths—have vastly 
greater resources to throw at undermining the rules than regulators do at designing them. What is 
more, the relationship between politicians and regulation is often unhelpful: electorates are only 
interested in financial regulation in times of crisis. This gives politicians incentives to be too lax in 
good times, and too interventionist in bad times. Chapter 4 considers these problems in the round. 
The goal is to ground policy discussion within a realistic sense of what is possible: we should be 
under no illusions that perfect regulation can be implemented. At the same time, we should be 
careful not to allow ourselves to become defeatist: whilst perfection is not possible, there are many 
feasible opportunities for improvement of financial regulation simply through better understanding 
of what its function and how it interacts with the financial system. Our two final underlying ideas 
also provide examples of how this has already taken place since the financial crisis.  
The sixth idea from which the book’s analysis proceeds is that the effects of the actions of 
financial firms and regulators in one jurisdiction may spill over to others and that firms may 
deliberately choose to relocate in order to achieve more favourable regulatory treatment. These 
spillovers have long been understood by economists to be problematic.23  What has proved truly 
difficult has been making progress on their resolution through international cooperation. Yet the 
post-crisis era has seen a remarkable impetus for multilateral engagement with this challenge, as 
exemplified by the establishment of the G20’s agenda-setting organisation for international financial 
regulation, the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’). 
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The final idea is that while the dichotomy between securities markets and bank regulation 
might once have served a valuable purpose, it is becoming increasingly untenable as securities 
markets and their associated institutions progressively perform banking functions and banks 
embrace securities markets activities.  Instead of thinking in compartmentalized forms, we should 
adopt a holistic approach. The interface between banks and markets has become so complex that an 
approach to maintaining systemic stability which focuses at the level of the system as a whole is 
required. So-called macro-prudential regulation is intended to do just this. The key insights of 
section E, which are reflected throughout the rest of the book, are that measures which protect the 
integrity of the system as a whole generally must be targeted at that level. The establishment of 
macro-prudential oversight bodies, endowed with extensive powers to intervene in the functioning 
of the financial sector, has been one of the major intellectual achievements of the post-crisis era. 
While this holistic approach is an underlying theme of the book, we have sought to embed it 
and all the other ideas in a more conventional framework that starts from the traditional view of the 
financial system as comprising securities markets and banks.  We then adopt the purpose based, 
economic, functional, dynamic, cost minimizing, macro, international, holistic approach to regulation 
that underlies these ideas in each of sections B to F.  We progressively move from the traditional 
structure in the early sections of the book to reflect this approach in the later sections.  That way, we 
do not eschew the more conventional rule-based, legal, institutional, static, micro, domestic, 
segmented approach to regulation but instead demonstrate how it translates into the new 
framework.  We can thereby provide a comprehensive and inclusive pedagogical approach to 
financial regulation, to which those who come from a traditional legal background and those with 
more economics training can both relate.   
1.5 An Overview of the rest of the book  
Sections B to E of the book present a series of topics in substantive financial regulation. These are 
discussed first from a policy perspective, then with an overview of the relevant regulatory provisions 
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as implemented in the US and EU. In sections B and C, respectively, we consider the regulation, 
respectively, of financial markets and of credit intermediation. These two sections perhaps most 
closely track the scope of traditional law school courses, in securities regulation and banking 
regulation, respectively. Rather than abandon these well-understood and widely used categories, we 
have chosen to present material falling squarely within them accordingly. However, the treatment 
involves significantly less coverage of legal detail, and more coverage of policy underpinnings, than 
would be the case in a standard law school course. This makes it feasible to cover both sets of topics 
in the same book/course. The advantage of this approach is that readers who have understood the 
basic issues in relation both to markets and credit intermediation are then able to understand better 
the distinct issues raised in sections D and E, which deal with ‘crossover’ issues spanning both 
markets and banks. Section D treats issues in relation to consumers and the financial system, and 
section E deals specifically with the regulation of the new intersection between banks and financial 
markets described above and in Chapter 2. We take a central lesson of the financial crisis to be the 
importance of better understanding, and regulation, of this sector. 
Section B begins with an account, in Chapter 5, of the economic theory of financial markets. 
This covers key concepts for understanding regulatory goals in this area, such as the theory of 
market efficiency. Chapter 6 is concerned with market infrastructure. This is, in a sense, the 
institutional ‘nuts and bolts’ that together go to make up functioning financial markets. In particular, 
it is concerned with the means by which the infrastructure of financial markets are organised—
exchanges, market makers, counterparties, clearing and settlement and the like. A premise of the 
discussion is that a certain configuration of this infrastructure is necessary for well-functioning 
markets. The chapter’s discussion is concerned with the ways in which this infrastructure can be 
provided, and associated regulation. 
The next three chapters cover issues at the core of the regulation of financial markets. In 
Chapter 7, we discuss the regulation of disclosure by issuers—that is, firms that have raised capital 
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from public markets. Central questions here concern the scope and timing of both initial disclosures 
surrounding an IPO (that is, the prospectus) and subsequent disclosures (for example, information 
having a material impact on pricing). Chapter 8 is concerned with regulation of the conduct of 
participants in the market—in particular, market manipulation, insider trading, and short selling. We 
see that the principal concern of all these aspects of market regulation is with the informational 
efficiency and accuracy of stock market prices. This concern is also reflected in the regulation of 
information intermediaries who function to assist the market in pricing securities—analysts, 
underwriters and credit rating agencies, which is discussed in Chapter 9.  
Section C, which is entitled ‘Banks’, is concerned with the traditional goals of banking 
regulation, namely the prudential regulation of institutions. The section begins with Chapter 10, 
which sets out the economic theory of banking. We explore the rationale for intermediation via 
banks, rather than directly via markets. Chapters 11 and 12 respectively deal with the prudential 
regulation of bank capital and liquidity. Chapters 13 and 14 reflect post-crisis innovations in the 
resolution of troubled banks and the governance of financial institutions. And Chapter 15 considers 
the regulation of payment and settlement systems.  
Section D considers regulation of the relationships between consumers and the financial 
system. It begins, in Chapter 16, with a discussion of the theory of consumer financial regulation. 
This differs from the economic bases for regulation advanced elsewhere in the book in that we 
incorporate insights from behavioural economics. Chapter 16’s central enquiry is the extent to which 
these behavioural considerations—bounded rationality and the like—justify more intensive 
regulatory intervention than in relation to other aspects of the financial system. The answer turns 
out to be a qualified yes, but more qualified than we might at first think. Whilst the problems that 
behavioural biases introduce into consumer decision-making are very real, the extent to which 
regulatory intervention can actually succeed in ameliorating matters—as opposed simply to 
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introducing an additional layer of costs that ultimately must be borne by consumers—is far from 
clear.  
Chapters 17 and 18 then consider applications of the theory to two of the most important 
contexts in which consumers accessing the financial system may need protection: the giving of 
financial advice (Chapter 17) and the purchase of financial products from financial institutions 
(Chapter 18). There is no separate chapter regarding ‘consumer’ purchase of securities on secondary 
markets, however. Whilst some scholars articulate a dichotomy between the promotion of 
‘consumer protection’ and of ‘market efficiency’ in relation to securities markets,24 we do not see 
any such divide. Regulation that seeks to promote informational efficiency and price accuracy in 
secondary markets will necessarily protect consumers trading in those markets: by definition, the 
price will be ‘fair’ as it will reflect the best available estimate of the value of the securities. It is 
precisely because markets for financial advice and financial products are not secondary, but rather 
are transactions directly between the consumer and a financial institution, that additional protection 
may be needed. 
Section E, entitled ‘Markets and Banks’, forms the fulcrum of the book. It explores the 
challenges posed by the developments charted in the financial system, and what was revealed by 
the financial crisis, for regulation at the intersection of institutions and markets. The 
interpenetration of bank-based credit intermediation and market-based credit intermediation was 
not only at the core of the financial crisis but continues to create the most challenging financial 
regulatory problems for financial stability.  The following five topics are considered.  Chapter 19 
discusses Shadow Banks—institutions that perform credit intermediation services functionally 
equivalent to traditional banks, but falling outside the ambit of traditional banking regulation. The 
central question of this chapter is to determine what is ‘functionally equivalent’ to a bank: that is, 
what should be the domain of banking regulation. Chapter 20 deals with Market Making. Market 
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makers hold inventories of financial assets with a view to being able to meet demand for both sales 
and purchases. If the volume of trade is large enough, it may not be necessary to have market 
makers who hold inventory at all: order-driven markets simply provide a technological route to 
connection of buyers and sellers. Where volumes of trade are low, having market makers hold 
inventories on their own balance sheets may be crucial for ensuring that trade can occur at all. 
However, this in turn depends on the ability of the market makers themselves to weather sudden 
swings in prices. 
As has been discussed, the rise of institutional investors has been a key trend over the past 
30 years. These investment vehicles are regulated in order to protect consumers, issues that have 
been treated in Chapter 18. But this regulation intended to protect consumers may have unintended 
consequences for the system as a whole. Chapter 21 discusses these issues. In particular, many 
regulatory regimes place substantive restrictions on the types of asset into which institutional 
investors can put their funds, motivated by a desire to protect end-investors from excess risk. With 
the massive growth in funds invested through collective investment vehicles, such restrictions come 
to impose an artificial constraint (or stimulus) for certain types of asset class. To the extent that 
there are no substantive restrictions, a related issue concerns the process by which managers of 
such collective investment vehicles go about selecting the types of asset class into which they will 
invest their funds. 
Chapters 22 and 23 consider two regulatory initiatives geared towards the preservation of 
the system as a whole which have emerged as a response to the financial crisis. Chapter 22 deals 
with structural regulation of financial institutions. Specifically, it is concerned with rules limiting the 
types of business activity that may be carried on by entities engaging in particular types of core 
services within the financial system. The nature and motivation for such restrictions are varied. 
Historically the best-known example was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which mandated the 
separation of investment and commercial banks in the US. The original rationales were largely 
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concerned with consumer protection and market integrity. In particular, during the 1920s, US banks 
had encouraged their depositors to invest in the stock market, with brokerage services supplied by 
the banks themselves. The concern was that they had aggressively supplied ‘margin’ lending to their 
customers, causing the latter to become overindebted and the stock market prices to be driven up 
inappropriately. Structural separation, it was thought, would put an end to this. Only secondary was 
the concern that losses on margin lending could endanger the soundness of the commercial banks 
themselves. This latter concern has resurfaced in the more recent iteration of interest in structural 
regulation. Proposals in both Europe and the US are concerned to insulate ‘safe’ commercial banking 
form ‘risky’ investment banking activities, especially proprietary trading in financial markets. 
Unfortunately, the appropriate positioning of market making activity within these frameworks is not 
obvious. There is therefore a close relationship between this material and Chapter 20. 
Chapter 23 deals with macro-prudential regulation, the new regulatory discipline of looking 
at and governing the financial system as a whole. Making the case for such intervention is far easier 
than determining what this intervention should actually look like. The chapter discusses the 
theoretical background, the principal tools for intervention and their limitations. Globalisation poses 
a central challenge for regulation aimed at the level of the system as a whole, because regulation is 
national—or at most regional—whereas ‘the’ financial system is now global. 
This concludes the book’s discussion of substantive topics. Section F then turns to what we 
term ‘Regulatory Architecture’: questions of the design of regulatory institutions themselves. 
Chapter 24 begins Section F with an overview of the terrain that follows in the following five 
chapters. These chapters then proceed as follows. Chapter 25 deals with the sources of financial 
regulation. We generally think of ‘regulation’ as supplied directly by the state, but it might 
alternatively be permitted by the state to be supplied by private actors. Private parties may have 
advantages in accessing and analysing information; public actors may have advantages in terms of 
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credibility of enforcement. The appropriate balance between the two is a delicate one, the contours 
of which Chapter 25 details.  
Chapter 26 is concerned with the appropriate structure of regulatory agencies. The old 
‘institutional’ structure, as practised in the US, was shown to be problematic for the reasons 
discussed above. Yet it is unfortunately not obvious what should be done instead.25  The limitations 
of the institutional model are well known, and indeed underlay its abandonment in the UK at the 
turn of the century in favour of a single integrated regulator, the FSA. Yet the FSA too failed 
spectacularly in its role, apparently because its goals and priorities were, respectively, poorly defined 
and set. The lesson seems to be that integrating regulation should simply shift attention from the 
structure of regulators to the process of goal and priority setting. Perhaps because of the loss of 
credibility of the integrated model, or perhaps because of political disagreement about where it 
should be based, the EU has simply proceeded to implement a ‘new’ federal regulatory structure of 
the ‘old’ institutional variety in the immediate aftermath to the financial crisis, with separate 
regulators for banks (the European Banking Authority) and markets (the European Securities Market 
Authority).   
There is a third model for the structure of financial regulation, which has not been 
discredited by the crisis. This goal-oriented model posits that for each (functional) goal of financial 
regulation, there should be a regulatory champion. The best-known version of this approach is the 
so-called ‘twin peaks’ model, whereby there is a separate prudential and conduct regulator.26  This 
was in effect in Australia, which weathered the financial crisis very successfully, and has now been 
implemented in the UK. Post crisis reform in the US, whilst not dismantling the old institutional 
structure of regulation, purports to create a financial stability champion through creation of the 
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Financial Stability Oversight Council, a college of financial regulators that is tasked with responsibility 
to monitor systemic risk throughout the financial system.   
Chapter 27 is about the political economy of regulation. It discusses the way in which 
regulators are appointed and appraised, and mechanisms of accountability to democratically elected 
politicians. It also discusses the tensions between electoral cycles, volatility of public interest in 
financial regulation, and technocratic expertise in agencies. It then goes on to consider the problems 
of interest group lobbying; in particular by financial sector firms. A range of mechanisms is 
considered that may serve to ameliorate these problems. 
Chapter 28 discusses supervision and enforcement. Supervision is an on-going dialogue with 
regulated firms; enforcement is action taken to punish (and deter) non-compliance. Perspectives 
differ on the appropriate allocation of resources as between the two activities, as techniques for 
eliciting good conduct. The chapter identifies the types of issues for which supervision-led and 
enforcement-led regulatory strategies, respectively, are likely to be successful. 
Chapter 29 rounds off Section E with a discussion of the problems posed by the international 
context of financial regulation. The chapter discusses three techniques by which international 
cooperation has been furthered. The first is by legal multilateral binding agreements, such as the EU. 
The second is through ‘soft law’ multilateral agreements, such as the G20 and the guidance issued by 
the Financial Stability Board as well as international standard setting by agreement among bank 
supervisors, the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. And the third is through 
bilateral agreements between leading states. A cause for optimism, despite the limitations of 
financial regulation announced in chapter 4 and echoed throughout Section F, is how much progress 
has been made in the direction of international cooperation since the financial crisis.  
Chapter 30 concludes the book as a whole by reviewing and restating the core messages, 
along with the outlook for the future.  
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1.6 Conclusion 
As will be clear, the book seeks to cover a vast amount of substantive terrain. To make this possible, 
it is necessary to fly at a higher altitude than is normally the case with a legal text. What we do might 
be termed macro, rather than micro, legal analysis. As should by now be clear, our aim in doing this 
is different from a typical text. We are not seeking to give the reader a sufficient knowledge of the 
relevant rules so as to be able give a client legal advice about compliance. This would require many 
thousands of pages. What is more, the pace of change in financial regulation is such that it would 
likely be out of date before it even hit the bookshelves. Rather, our goal has been to present a set of 
principles with which readers can be equipped to understand better the detail of substantive 
regulation. Because they are cross cutting, these principles are rarely articulated in a general way; 
hence the benefit to our generalist approach. And because these principles are not—or should not 
be—as transient as the detail of substantive regulation, we hope they will equip the reader to have a 
critical understanding of not just today’s rules, but of tomorrow’s as well.  
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